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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant/ ] 
vs. ] 
R. MONT EVANS and JANET ] 
ROSE, ] 
Defendants/Respondents. ] 
1 Case No. 870454 
RESPONDENT EVANS' PETITION FOR REHEARING 
On Appeal from the Memorandum Decision and Order 
of the District Court of the Third Judicial District 
for Salt Lake County/ State of Utah 
This petition seeks a rehearing or, more accurately, a 
hearing with full briefing and argument on the significant 
constitutional issue of whether the Utah Legislature is truly 
the judge of all issues pertaining to the disqualification of 
its members regardless of the purpose or legal consequence 
attendant to the determination of such issues. 
This petition for rehearing simply makes three points: 
First, the lower court correctly decided the 
legislative branch and not the judicial branch had the 
constitutional power to determine the separation of power 
issues pertaining to Mr. Evans* qualifications as a legislator, 
regardless of whether those separation of power issues were 
being determined for the purpose of seating Mr. Evans in the 
Legislature or continuing his employment in the executive 
branch. 
Second, this Court did not decide the issue presented 
in this appeal in State v. Evans, 735 P.2d 29 (Utah 1986) 
(MEvans IH) in that original action. Since the holding of 
Evans I was simply that the legislative branch had the power to 
determine issues of disqualification for the purpose of 
seating, the question of which branch, the legislative branch 
or the judicial branch, had the power to determine such issue 
for the purpose of employment was not briefed or passed upon by 
the Court. 
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Third, that summary disposition, without full briefing 
and argument, is a disservice to the significance of the 
question presented and the deference that could be shown to 
legislative interest by providing a full hearing before the 
Legislature's power to determine issues of disqualification is 
eroded and undermined by judicial fiat. 
1. The lower court's decision W9§ constitutionally 
correct. The Constitution makes the Legislature the "judge" of 
the "qualification of its members". If the Legislature is to 
be the judge of its members' qualifications, it has the power 
to decide all issues pertaining to their disqualification. 
That is not only the logic of the power conferred, that is what 
this Court explicitly held in Evans I. 
Separation of power issues, the issues germane to the 
question of disqualification of Respondent Evans, have a 
two-edged blade. Separation of power constraints can preclude 
service in the Legislature or, on the other side, employment in 
the executive branch. The blade may have two edges but the 
point of inquiry or the question of disqualification is the 
same. Does the elected representative's simultaneous service 
run afoul of the separation of power prohibitions of the 
Constitution? The issue of disqualification is identical 
regardless of whether the issue is determined for the purpose 
of seating or for the purpose of employment. 
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Since the Legislature is charged with being the 
"judge" on all issues of disqualification, the judicial branch 
should not, as this Court has directed in its minute order 
without explanation, usurp that constitutional function. The 
Court would usurp the power of the Legislature to determine all 
issues of disqualification if it reaches the merits of the 
separation of power issues in this case because (1) it would 
decide on the merits the very issue the Legislature has decided 
in the case of Mr. Evans and (2) while it will not decide that 
issue for the purpose of seating, the determination of the same 
separation of power issue for the purpose of employment will 
undermine the prior legislative determination by now having the 
judicial branch say whether Mr. Evans cannot constitutionally 
do what the Legislature previously has said could be done. 
In short, when the Legislature is charged with being 
the "judge" of all issues pertaining to disqualification, the 
Legislature and not the courts exercise the judicial power of 
the State of Utah. That is not only sound analysis, that is 
precisely the point this Court made in Ellison v. Barnes, 23 
Utah 183, 63 P. 899, 901 (1901) when it stated: 
The power thus given to the houses of the 
legislature is a judicial power, and each house 
acts in a judicial capacity when it exerts it. 
The express vesting of the judicial power in a 
particular case so closely and vitally affecting 
the body to whom that power is given takes it out 
of the general judicial power. 
I£. at 901. 
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2. This Court in Evans I did not reach and did not 
decide that the judicial branch had constitutional power to 
determine separation of power issues pertaining to 
disqualification if those issues were raised fpr the purpose of 
determining the legality of the legislator's employment with 
the executive branch. This Court held in Evans I that the 
Legislature had the power to determine all issues of 
disqualification including separation of power issues 
pertaining to the elected representative for the purpose of 
seating. It did not decide that the judicial branch rather 
than the legislative branch had the power to determine that 
same precise issue — for the purpose of employment. 
Evans I was an original action in this Court in the 
nature of an extraordinary writ. The Attorney General did ask 
this Court to determine the merits of the separation of power 
issue with regard to Mr. Evans, an issue that had been 
previously determined by the Legislature/ for the purpose of 
terminating Mr. Evans' employment. The Court refused to do 
so. The Court said: 
We believe the latter question should not be 
resolved in this proceeding for an extraordinary 
writ even though we have jurisdiction to do so. 
State v. Evans, 735 P.2d 29, 33 (Utah 1987) 
The Court's statement in Evans I is ambiguous. It may 
be read# as the Attorney General argues, that the Court has the 
power to determine the separation of power issues pertaining to 
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questions pertaining to the legality of his employment but 
withhold judgment on the other. Particularly, why would the 
Court decide the question of constitutional jurisdiction between 
the legislative branch and judicial branch when the adjudication 
of that particular question was not necessary to its holding 
that the Legislature had the constitutional power to determine 
all issues pertaining to Mr. Evans' disqualification for the 
purpose of seating. 
Second, the question of whether the judicial or 
legislative branch had the power to decide the issues pertaining 
to Mr. Evans' disqualification for the purpose of termination of 
his employment were not briefed in Evans I. Read the briefs. 
Why would this Court reach out to decide a major constitutional 
issue, an issue that has been decided differently in other 
jurisdictions, without brief or argument? Compare Fowler v. 
Bostick, 108 S.E.2d 720 (Ga. 1959) with Monaahan v. School Dist. 
No. 1, 315 P.2d 797 (Ore. 1957). 
3« This matter is not a matter for summary 
disposition. Mr. Evans' position is supported by fair analysis 
and authority. Counsel respectfully suggests that the Court 
should gain the benefit of the full adversary process before 
deciding an important question. 
The issue that this Court summarily decided is an issue 
with regard to the division of power between the legislative 
branch and the judicial branch. Certainly questions of that 
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decide the issues of disqualification for the purpose of 
seating, would be worthy for consideration by this Court. The 
Court did not consider those issues in Evans 
not granted the parties an opportunity to brief and argue those 
should do so. The petition for rehearing 
should be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
summarily reversing 
the district court and set this .appeal r - , briefing and 
oral argument. 
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petition fou rehearing is presented in good faith and not for 
delay. 
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